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In 1999 and 2003, two controversial wars were fought in the name of international order. The 
first, in Kosovo, was waged to prevent tragic humanitarian catastrophe not seen on the 
continent of Europe since the Holocaust. The second, in Iraq, sought to change a regime 
whose previous use of weapons of mass destruction, and possible continued possession of 
them, were believed to be a threat to regional and world safety. Both interventions were 
historic in the sense that they represented the latest trials in the endeavours since 1919, at 
least, to institutionalise order over anarchy in international affairs. As such, they were about 
matters with reach far beyond their immediate conflicts. That is because of what joined them, 
despite their many differences, which was nothing less than contravention of a principle born 
of world wars.  
 
The principle at stake was collective security underpinned by international law and enshrined 
in the Charter of the United Nations. From 1945, the UN Security Council was supposed to 
hold primacy above nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and only it 
could authorise the use of force. Yet the wars in Kosovo and Iraq commenced without its 
express authorisation and were not only considered by most to be strictly illegal under 
international law but also to be direct challenges to the superiority of the Security Council 
and, to an extent, the very idea of the UN. Furthermore, these two wars were important in that 
they raised one of the abiding questions of international relations since Woodrow Wilson, 
President of the United States, had involved his nation more fully in the affairs of others. Now 
altered by the collapse of Cold War structures leaving the world with only one superpower, it 
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was how, and for what purposes, the US should use its power beyond its borders and how 
other nations should react. 
 
Answers to that question were variably formed in response to the changing political 
conditions and international setting of their times. That was true of the events of 1999 and 
2003 which exploded in a world already unsettled by the end of the Cold War and then 
upturned by the 9/11 attacks. The principal actor in response to both international conflicts 
was the US president: in 1999, Bill Clinton, and in 2003, George W. Bush. From dissimilar 
political approaches and with contrasting personalities, these presidents grasped for foreign 
policies that would defend their nation’s interests from rapidly emerging threats. The effect 
was the reassertion of American power overseas in a period which was defined by increasing 
US unilateralism and described by one prominent contemporary commentator as the ‘unipolar 
moment’.1 For many, this was an era dominated by a new generation of ugly Americans, but 
one foreign leader became very close to them. Tony Blair, a British prime minister who 
claimed no experience or expertise of world affairs on taking office would, within two years, 
undergo an ‘awakening on foreign policy’, as he called it, and declare a doctrine to reorder the 
world.2 To pursue his aim, Blair called on his nation’s tradition of working with American 
presidents and led the United Kingdom in support of the US. As a result, from 1999 to 2003, 
the Anglo-American relationship was once again consequential to world affairs. These are the 
subjects of this article. 
 
Since 2003, there have been attempts to understand the causes and significance of the wars in 
Kosovo and especially Iraq, a reckoning which echoes the searching debates after the world 
wars. These efforts have taken two forms. One has concentrated on theoretical and historical 
principles and their evolution over the twentieth century and has revived arguments about 
intervention, law, war and international order. Advocates of liberal internationalism have 
restated their case with urgency while practitioners of realpolitik have reminded the world of 
the limits any order can achieve.3 Legal scholars have either defended the ideas and practice 
of international law, especially in relation to the use of force, or explored its relationship with 
                                                 
1 Charles Krauthammer, ‘The Unipolar Moment’, Foreign Affairs, 70.1 (1990-1991), pp. 23-33. 
2 Tony Blair, A Journey (London, 2010), p. 223. 
3 For example, G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition: Essays on American Power and 
International Order (London, 2006). On realpolitik, Henry Kissinger, World Order: Reflections on the 
Character of Nations and the Course of History (London, 2014) and Margaret Thatcher, Statecraft: Strategies 
for a Changing World (London, 2002). 
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politics and history.4 Historians have returned to the League of Nations and the United 
Nations to examine the concepts and processes that produced them and the enduring and 
novel historical issues at work in their creation and activity.5 Also, a particular interest in the 
history of human rights has featured.6 All of this scholarship extends work done in a previous 
epoch motivated by similar problems when the US fought another controversial war, in 
Vietnam.7 
 
In parallel with this body of literature, another one has focused on the politics and diplomacy 
of the US in the post-Cold War period and specifically on the Iraq war. Contemporary 
histories depicted a powerful US uncertain about how to navigate global complexity and 
drawn increasingly to unilateral action and away from doctrines or single strategies until 
9/11.8 The shocking attacks on that day forged the Bush administration’s pursuit of a neo-
Wilsonian mission for democratic enlargement through force and led to a calamitous war of 
choice in Iraq.9 The UK’s involvement in that war, and particularly Blair’s association with it, 
have already produced considerable analysis of him and of Britain’s foreign policy. Blair is 
portrayed as an emphatic liberal interventionist resolutely committed to support of the US and 
to a doctrine of international community.10 The more critical studies represent Blair’s wars 
and his policies as failures with some proposing alternatives that the prime minister and his 
government could, or should, have taken.11 Greater historical context has been offered by a 
                                                 
4 Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, The Internationalists And Their Plan to Outlaw War (London, 2017); 
Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Oxford, 2011); Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and 
Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (Cambridge, 2004). 
5 Patricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920-1946 (Oxford, 
2013); Paul Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The United Nations and the Quest for World Government 
(London, 2006); Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (London, 2012); Susan Pedersen, 
The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford, 2015); Glenda Sluga, Internationalism 
in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia, 2013). 
6 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA, 2010). 
7 For example, Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics 
(New York, 1965). 
8 Hal Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad: America’s Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World (Lexington, 
2008); Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 (New York, 2008). 
Also, David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals (New York, 2001); George 
Packer, Our Man: Richard Holbrooke and the End of the American Century (London, 2020). 
9 On Iraq, Terry H. Anderson, Bush’s Wars (Oxford, 2011). 
10 For an early account, John Kampfner, Blair’s Wars (London, 2004). Also, John Rentoul, Tony Blair: Prime 
Minister (London, 2001); Anthony Seldon, Blair (London, 2005); Philip Stephens, Tony Blair: The Making of a 
World Leader (London, 2004). On US-UK relations, Con Coughlin, American Ally: Tony Blair and the War on 
Terror (New York, 2006); James Naughtie, The Accidental American: Tony Blair and the Presidency (London, 
2004); and Peter Riddell, Hug Them Close: Blair, Clinton, Bush and the ‘Special Relationship’ (London, 2003). 
11 For example, David Coates and Joel Krieger, Blair’s War (Cambridge, 2004); Patrick Porter, Blunder: 
Britain’s War in Iraq (Oxford, 2018). Also, David Runciman, The Politics of Good Intentions: History, Fear 
and Hypocrisy in the New World Order (Princeton, 2006). 
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study of the Anglo-American relationship from the 1970s. It suggests that after 1989 a shared 
American and British vision of world order largely directed global affairs and proved resilient 
despite 9/11, Iraq and the 2008 financial crisis.12 
 
This article proceeds with the literatures on the twentieth century and on the post-Cold War 
and Iraq war eras in mind and seeks to draw on the preoccupations of both. It calls upon 
recently released digital archival sources to consider anew the events of 1999 and 2001-03 
and particularly the contexts and the roles of individuals at the apex of them, namely Clinton, 
Blair and Bush.13 It does so not to exalt high politics or to disregard the complex decision-
making of governments, nations or international systems. Nor does it claim that the Anglo-
American relationship was more than an important element of international affairs or that the 
UK was more than a prominent ally, among others, of the US. Yet it is to recognise the 
significance of the relationships between two presidents and a prime minister in determining 
why wars were fought in Kosovo and Iraq and why the Anglo-American relationship had 
global effects. The questions explored here are how those wars happened, what they meant, 
and what they represented in the history of US power and responses to it in the search for 
world order. 
 
Blair and Clinton at War: Kosovo 
 
By the time Blair became prime minister in 1997, Clinton had already spent four years 
dealing with the challenges and complexities of post-Cold War international affairs. Clinton’s 
predecessor, George H. W. Bush, had declared a new world order in 1990 but left office 
without its realisation.14 Clinton’s foreign policy was less ambitious. The pursuit of 
democratic enlargement was announced in September 1993 as the successor to containment, 
and was closely aligned with the feature of US Cold War foreign policy which survived 1989, 
namely economic expansion.15 Criticised for its lack of coherence in application, Clinton’s 
                                                 
12 James E. Cronin, Global Rules: America, Britain and a Disordered World (New Haven, 2014), pp. 289-316. 
13 Among other records, these include those of the Clinton Digital Library (hereafter CDL) and the documents 
produced by the UK Iraq Inquiry. 
14 Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress, 11 September 1990, 
https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/public-papers/2217. In general, Jeffrey A. Engel, When the World 
Seemed New: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War (Boston, 2017). 
15 Address to the UN General Assembly, 27 September 1993, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1993-
book2/pdf/PPP-1993-book2-doc-pg1612.pdf. Also, John Dumbrell, Clinton’s Foreign Policy: Between the 
Bushes, 1992-2000 (London, 2009). 
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foreign policy faced two problems.16 First was his administration’s primary focus on domestic 
matters. Second were unanswered questions presented by the crises that evolved in Haiti, 
Rwanda, Somalia and North Korea. These were when, and on what grounds, should the 
United States, either alone or with allies, abrogate the sovereignty of another nation to 
intervene in a conflict, and what if the situation in that nation was catastrophic but did not 
present the US with a direct security threat? In addition, there was a post-Cold War 
conundrum: what should be the US government’s attitude towards the United Nations and its 
Security Council, especially with regard to legitimacy and the use of force, when the US was 
the member state which contributed most financially and possessed the greatest capability to 
act? Such questions would dominate the post-9/11 era but they were present before non-state 
international terrorists had altered calculations of threat perception. 
 
The Clinton administration’s answers to these questions were not clear from 1993 to 1995 but 
one point was obvious: when domestic and foreign criticism affected the reputation of the 
president and his government, action followed. That was what had happened as the ethnic 
cleansing and massacres of the Bosnian war from 1992 brought degradation in Europe not 
seen since the Second World War. While European Union (EU) member states vacillated, the 
Clinton administration pursued arms-length diplomacy which by 1995 began to damage the 
president. In June of that year, the US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, told the 
administration’s foreign policy team that the ‘strategy we have now makes the President look 
weak’.17 Clinton himself said that if his government could not resolve the situation in Bosnia, 
‘We are history’.18 The result was a real achievement: in November 1995 a peace settlement 
was negotiated at Dayton, Ohio, where the Americans mediated between the leaders of 
Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia.19 Clinton could claim that he had reasserted American leadership 
and morality in foreign affairs. However, his administration’s success was temporary. The 
continued malevolence of the Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, and the acts of genocide 
                                                 
16 For an example of criticism, Richard N. Haas, ‘Fatal Distraction: Bill Clinton’s Foreign Policy’, Foreign 
Policy, 108 (Autumn 1997), pp. 112-123. 
17 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (London, 2003), p. 186. 
18 Brands, From Berlin, 177; New York Times, ‘The Clinton Record: Foreign Policy; Bosnia Policy Shaped by 
U.S. Military Role’, 29 July 1996, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/29/us/the-clinton-record-foreign-policy-
bosnia-policy-shaped-by-us-military-role.html. 
19 OSCE, Dayton Peace Agreement, 14 December 1995, https://www.osce.org/bih/126173; Chollet and 
Goldgeier, America, pp. 113-145; Packer, Our Man, pp. 367-391. 
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by Serbs against ethnic Albanian Kosovars in Kosovo from spring 1998 demanded further US 
intervention in the Balkans.20  
 
That would come from 24 March 1999 when the US-led Operation Allied Force, an 11-week 
NATO bombing campaign to deter Milosevic.21 This use of force by NATO was an historic 
departure from the norms of international order. It was prosecuted without the authorisation of 
the UN Security Council and thus in contravention of its Charter. In its first act of war in its 
50-year history, NATO justified its ostensibly illegal military intervention on the grounds that 
diplomatic negotiations had broken down and that force was a necessity to prevent actual and 
further humanitarian catastrophe.22 This danger was acknowledged by the UN Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan, as he also reminded NATO, and the world, of the primacy of the 
Security Council in maintaining international peace and security.23 He needed to do so 
because NATO’s engagement, even in the name of humanitarian action, was momentous in 
its implicit threat to UN rules. That fact, and the legitimacy of NATO’s bombing, were issues 
of debate at the time and have preoccupied legal scholars since. What was at stake was the 
system of collective security if the Kosovo action was a portent of future departures from the 
UN Charter.24 
 
These were the issues and principles with which NATO’s leaders dealt in 1999. While the US 
president was the most dominant figure among them, the British prime minister played a self-
appointed prominent part in their actions. Their collaboration gave NATO’s campaign in 
Kosovo a significant Anglo-American dimension, unlike its predecessor in Bosnia. In the 
early 1990s, John Major’s Conservative government retained a non-interventionist policy and 
was sceptical of the Bush administration’s new world order, even doubting the existence of 
the international community.25 In contrast, Blair’s New Labour government became both 
interventionist and ambitious. Within a matter of months of being gripped by the genocide in 
Kosovo, Blair attempted to assert his and the UK’s presence in the post-Cold War debates 
                                                 
20 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York, 2002), pp. 443-474. 
Human Rights Watch has documented the atrocities, 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/kosovo98/reports.shtml. 
21 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Washington DC, 
2000).  
22 NATO Press Release 1999(040), 23 March 1999, https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-040e.htm. 
23 UN Press Release, SG/SM/6938, 24 March 1999, https://www.un.org/press/en/1999/sgsm6938.doc.htm. 
24 Adam Roberts, ‘NATO’s “Humanitarian War” over Kosovo’, Survival, 41.3 (1999), pp. 102-23; Bruno 
Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’, European Journal of International Law, no. 10 
(1999), pp. 1-22; Simpson, Great Powers, pp. 194-223. 
25 Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London, 2002), pp. 6-7 and passim. 
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about the purpose of the UN and the responsibilities of the international community. While 
Blair had not entered office with such aspirations – he had travelled light on foreign policy 
and international relations – he would, over Kosovo, pursue them with a new-found zeal.26 
Attempts to understand how and why he did so have produced interesting interpretations. 
They suggest variously that Blair was motivated by morality, politics and his relationship 
with Clinton to take a lead in British foreign policy and international affairs.27 His 
announcement of his own doctrine amid the Kosovo crisis has also been seen as significant, 
especially in relation to his later approach to Iraq after 2001.28 The extent to which Blair was 
personally compelled to intervene over Kosovo, manipulate Clinton, risk his prime 
ministership and claim leadership of the international community without seemingly having 
prepared the ground or contemplated the implications of his new doctrine, are points still open 
for analysis. So too is the significance of Kosovo for Blair’s evolution, its legacy for his 
involvement with Bush after 9/11, and the course of world events. 
 
In his memoirs, Blair dedicated a chapter to the Kosovo crisis of 1999, a signal of its 
importance to him and the narrative he wished to present; the only other international events 
to receive his detailed attention are 9/11 and Iraq. Kosovo was meaningful to Blair as an 
‘abrupt’ ‘awakening on foreign policy’, an intriguing choice of words not least due its 
secular/spiritual ambiguity.29 The awakening did not take place immediately. Blair had been 
aware of the emerging crisis in the Balkans but left Britain’s part in international diplomacy 
largely to his first foreign secretary, Robin Cook. His priorities as prime minister had not been 
foreign affairs but domestic policy and the search for peace in Northern Ireland. While 
Milosevic featured increasingly in Blair’s telephone conversations with Clinton in 1998, it 
was the president who set the pace. He warned in August that ‘we are getting closer to a 
major humanitarian disaster’ in Kosovo and suggested intervention. Moreover, Clinton 
wanted ‘to make it clear [to Milosevic] that, while we would like to get UN authority, we can 
                                                 
26 Jonathan Powell, The New Machiavelli: How to Wield Power in the Modern World (London, 2011), p. 262. 
27 Oliver Daddow, ‘Tony’s War? Blair, Kosovo, and the interventionist impulse in British foreign policy’, 
International Affairs, 85.2 (2009), pp. 547-560; Kampfner, Blair’s Wars, p. 36; Andrew Rawnsley, The End of 
the Party: The Rise and Fall of New Labour (London, 2010), pp. 7-8, 92, 174; Riddell, Hug, pp. 1-23 and 
passim. 
28 Coates and Krieger, Blair’s Wars, pp. 107-110; Daddow, ‘Tony’s War’, pp. 549-554; Lawrence Freedman, 
‘Force and the international community, Blair’s Chicago speech and the criteria for intervention’, International 
Relations, 31.2 (2017), pp. 107-124; Jason Ralph, ‘After Chilcot: The “Doctrine of International Community” 
and the UK Decision to Invade Iraq’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 13.3 (August 
2011), pp. 304-325. 
29 Blair, Journey, pp. 223-253, 223. 
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do it without it’.30 The president’s proposition held within it a radical approach to revision of 
international order – a departure from the UN Charter’s principles of authorisation for the use 
of force – principles which British governments had habitually upheld. Yet he would find that 
Blair’s own view was not different to his own. 
 
Before the point of decision about possible military intervention to dissuade Milosevic and his 
Serbian forces, Clinton had worked with Blair in the tradition of effective Anglo-American 
relations. They had discussed purpose and strategy and carved up diplomatic tasks. Following 
Clinton’s request, Blair’s diplomacy at the North Atlantic Council on 12 October 1998 
contributed to the announcement of activation orders for NATO airstrikes on Milosevic’s 
forces.31 Two days later, Clinton called Blair to say that he could not ‘thank you enough for 
the strength you showed on Kosovo’. Whereas it had taken ‘two years to get everybody off 
the dime’ over Bosnia, ‘it happened here a lot quicker, in no small measure because we were 
in lockstep from the get go’.32 While the activation orders were not implemented as Milosevic 
conformed to NATO’s demands, the threat of force had been raised. That act alone was 
significant as it signalled that the US government, with British support, had readied NATO 
for military intervention prior to securing UN Security Council authorisation for its use. A 
further act, not in the Balkans, but against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, then extended 
the challenge to UN norms.  
 
In December 1998, a combination of the ongoing resistance of Iraq to the post-Gulf War UN 
weapons inspection regime, and Republican and neo-conservative criticism of the Clinton 
administration’s policies in response, produced a historic US-UK military intervention.33 
Operation Desert Fox, a four-day airstrike against Iraq, involved the use of force by two 
members of the UN Security Council against a sovereign state without strict UN 
authorisation, even if it was prosecuted in defence of existing UN resolutions. The other 
permanent members of the Security Council viewed the situation in Iraq differently and 
questioned the legitimacy and necessity of the airstrikes.34 As such, the bombs that dropped 
                                                 
30 Telephone conversation (hereafter Telcon), 6 August 1998, Clinton Digital Library (hereafter CDL). 
31 NATO, Statement to the Press, 13 October 1998, https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981013a.htm. 
32 Telcon, 14 October 1998, CDL. 
33 Chollet and Goldgeier, America, pp. 178-209 
34 David M. Malone, The International Struggle over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council 1980-2005 
(Oxford, 2006), pp. 160-1. On reactions, UK House of Commons Library Research Paper 99/13, Iraq: “Desert 
Fox” and Policy Developments, 10 February 1999, 
https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/RP99-13; on France, Frédéric Bozo, A 
History of the Iraq Crisis: France, the United States, and Iraq, 1991-2003 (New York, 2016), pp. 44-63. 
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on Iraqi targets were seen as a unilateral action which separated the UK and US from the UN 
and indicated their frustration with its politics and processes. Yet Operation Desert Fox did 
not represent a coherent attempt to revise the UN Charter or reform international order. 
Clinton’s foreign policy was more cautious in its ambitions and Blair’s was yet to form. It 
would do so over Kosovo and put him out in front of the US president. 
 
From spring 1998, atrocities perpetrated in Kosovo by Serbian forces, and in response by the 
Kosovo Liberation Army, an ethnically-Albanian militia, increased in murderous number.35 
The US diplomat who had orchestrated the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, Richard 
Holbrooke, was sent back to the Balkans as the Clinton administration’s special envoy to halt 
the violence. Working with the international Contact Group, and with the threat of NATO’s 
activation orders in his pocket, Holbrooke achieved Milosevic’s agreement in October 1998 
to comply with UN Security Council resolution 1199 which demanded a ceasefire between 
Serbian and KLA forces and oversight by observers.36 Milosevic’s promise lasted until 15 
January 1999 when Serbian police forces massacred 45 Kosovans in the village of Racak. 
That act, more than any other to date in the Kosovo crisis, revealed the brutality of the post-
Cold War disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, the Serbian president’s defiance of the 
international community, and his return to the use of ethnic cleansing. For Blair, it was a 
pivotal moment which began his awakening on foreign policy.37  
 
After the Racak massacre, Kosovo featured more significantly than it had done in the Blair-
Clinton telephone conversations. So too did Blair’s initiation of the subject. Clinton was 
already disposed to act, saying to him on 21 January that ‘I don’t want to get into a pickle, but 
now that 45 people have been slaughtered and Milosevic is trying to throw the KVM out, we 
don’t have any choice but to do something’.38 Diplomatic attempts at Rambouillet in February 
1999 failed due to Serbian non-cooperation and continued Serb atrocities.39 By 20 March, 
international monitors were withdrawn and it was thereafter, on 23rd, that NATO announced 
Operation Allied Force.40 The difference between this NATO action, which lasted for almost 
                                                 
35 Human Rights Watch, Kosovo War Crimes Chronology, 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/kosovo98/timeline.shtml. 
36 UNSCR 1199(1998), 23 September 1998, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1199; also, Albright, Madam, pp. 
388-90; Packer, Our Man, pp. 408-9. 
37 PBS, Frontline Interviews, Tony Blair, undated, 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/blair.html. 
38 Telcon, 21 January 1999, CDL. KVM was the Kosovo Verification Mission of international observers. 
39 Marc Weller, ‘The Rambouillet conference on Kosovo’, International Affairs, 75.2 (1999), pp. 211-251. 
40 NATO Press Release 1999(040), 23 March 1999, https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-040e.htm. 
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three months, and that of the Bosnian war of 1992-95, was that it did not have UN Security 
Council authorisation.41 NATO claimed legitimacy on the basis of averting humanitarian 
catastrophe but the bombing was a second, controversial and historic departure by members 
of the UN Security Council and, with them, NATO allies, from the UN Charter’s provisions 
for the use of force.  
 
Clinton, with support from Blair, had begun to revise the way the world worked in the name 
of humanitarian intervention. At stake were the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and 
stable international order. Operation Allied Force challenged the Charter’s relevance and 
implicitly called for its revision. Disagreements in the Security Council had rendered it 
incapacitated, from the American and British perspectives. In particular, the government of 
the Russian Federation opposed NATO’s engagement as it attempted to sustain its own 
presence in the Balkans. On the day that bombs began to fall, its leader, Boris Yeltsin, wrote 
to Clinton. He urged continued international diplomacy and condemned the intervention: ‘On 
what basis does NATO take it upon itself to decide the fate of peoples in sovereign states? 
Who gave it the right to act in the role of guardian of order?’42 Two days later, the Russian 
Federation tabled a resolution in the UN Security Council which described NATO’s action as 
a ‘unilateral use of force’ which constituted ‘a flagrant violation of the United Nations 
Charter’ and demanded cessation. It was defeated by 12 votes to three but Russian opposition 
remained.43 
 
There were actually limits to Clinton’s commitment to Kosovo. Vietnam’s political legacy 
and strategic concerns about ground forces led him to state categorically in his address to the 
nation as bombing commenced that US troops would not be sent to fight.44 Thus while the 
action itself was radical, it was not open-ended. That very fact would cause problems in the 
Blair-Clinton relationship as Britain’s prime minister began to formalise publicly his 
government’s interventionist foreign policy and try to work with the US president to achieve 
                                                 
41 Like Operation Desert Fox, Operation Allied Force referred to existing resolutions: UNSCR 1199(1998), 23 
September 1998, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1199 and UNSCR 1203(1998), 24 October 1998, 
http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1203. 
42 Yeltsin to Clinton, 24 March 1999, CDL; also Washington Post, ‘Russian Leader Cancels Trip in Protest’, 24 
March 1999, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/march99/russia032499.htm; BBC News, ‘Why 
Russia Opposes Intervention in Kosovo’, 13 October 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/111585.stm. 
43 UNSC, S/1999/328, 26 March 1999, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/kos%20S%201999%20328.pdf; UNSC, 3989th meeting, 26 March 1999, 
https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/PV.3989. 
44 Address to the Nation, 24 March 1999, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-
airstrikes-against-serbian-targets-the-federal-republic-yugoslavia. 
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it. On 5 April, as the bombing continued, the president told the prime minister that ‘under no 
circumstances are we going to be defeated. If you tell me that, and I tell you that, and we hold 
hands’.45 Lockstep had become hand-holding but Clinton’s call came on the Easter weekend 
of 1999 when, according to one of his biographers, Blair ‘reached a nadir’ and ‘confided to 
one aide, “This could be the end of me”’.46 The bombing campaign was not showing early 
success, Milosevic had accelerated ethnic cleansing, questions were being raised by 
politicians and the media and international opinion was mixed about allied action in the 
Balkans. 
 
Over the following week, Blair and Clinton spoke of intensifying the diplomatic and military 
pressure on Milosevic but the prime minister had reached a point of transition about how and 
what that should mean which would shortly separate him from the president.47 His own 
subsequent account emphasises his frustration and determination. He told his closest aides 
that ‘I am willing to lose the job on this, but we are going to go for broke. … The response so 
far to what was a monstrous and unpardonable outrage had been pathetic. … I would use all 
my chips with President Clinton to get a commitment to ground troops on the agenda’.48 It 
was Blair’s morally-inspired commitment to save the Kosovars and his belief that the 
humanitarian tragedy of Kosovo could not be halted without ground troops that led him to do 
what prime ministers rarely seek to do to presidents: force their hand. And he did so not only 
privately but publicly. 
 
To influence events in Kosovo, Blair personally intervened in NATO military planning and 
public relations and exploited his relationship with Clinton. In their telephone calls, Blair 
began to take the initiative from 16 April.49 This was just before he was to travel to the US for 
meetings with Clinton and his foreign policy team ahead of NATO’s 50th anniversary 
celebrations in Washington DC from 23 to 25 April. Blair also used this trip to give his most 
important speech to date on foreign affairs, going further than he had done in an attempt to 
persuade the Clinton administration over Kosovo and set the agenda for the international 
community. Before leaving London, he indicated for the first time that deployment of ground 
troops in Kosovo was now being considered, saying in the Commons that ‘All options are 
                                                 
45 Telcon, 5 April 1999, CDL. 
46 Seldon, Blair, p. 395. 
47 Telcons, 10 and 14 April 1999, CDL. 
48 Blair, Journey, p. 237. Also, Seldon, Blair, p. 396. 
49 Telcon, 16 April 1999, CDL. 
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always kept under review’.50 The problem was that Clinton had ruled them out. Arriving in 
Washington, Blair and Clinton had a tense meeting, the president ‘visibly uncomfortable’ and 
‘almost silent’ throughout.51 ‘What saved us in the end,’ Albright wrote, ‘was largely the 
relationship between President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair’.52 They left the meeting 
together and were alone for over 30 minutes. What passed between them is unknown but 
thereafter Blair ‘did not press his case for a firm commitment to a ground campaign’ at the 
summit and Clinton, in return, agreed ‘to do “whatever was necessary” to ensure victory’.53 
They also agreed jointly to lobby NATO leaders on planning for ground troops, and to secret 
Anglo-American military preparations for their use.54 Blair had pushed Clinton as far as the 
president would go, at this stage. 
 
Sensitivity to the president’s position did not prevent Blair from using his visit to the US to 
become acknowledged as the West’s leading statesman on the future of international order. 
The day after meeting Clinton, he flew to Chicago to deliver the most significant foreign 
policy speech of his prime ministership. It had been hurriedly prepared, in large part by a 
British academic and not by government foreign policy experts, and given its title – the 
‘Doctrine of International Community’ – by Blair on the flight to the US.55 There had also 
seemingly been no ground laid, despite the ambition of the speech. With globalisation as his 
backdrop, Blair claimed boldly that ‘We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or 
not’ and in making the case for liberal intervention, outlined ‘five major considerations’ for 
which the speech has mostly been remembered.56 Yet it was an audacious, idealistic and 
wide-ranging call for a ‘serious and sustained’ focus on the principles and practice of 
international order and reform of the institutions on which it was based. The speech ended 
with a plea for the US to recognise its responsibilities, engage with world problems and not 
give in to isolationism. Clinton needed no reminding of that fact, especially as on 20 April 
1999, a Republican-led bipartisan Senate Resolution called on him to use ground troops in 
Kosovo.57  
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On his return from Chicago, Blair worked successfully with Clinton and other allies to ensure 
that NATO’s 50th anniversary summit in Washington went smoothly.58 Yet the prime minister 
flew back to London uncertain about what he had achieved personally with the president. He 
told an aide ‘that he still had “no idea” whether Clinton would really commit to ground 
troops’.59 Blair also feared that his ‘strong-arm tactics would backfire if Clinton felt 
bounced’.60 The president was now facing difficulties on all sides. Yeltsin telephoned Clinton 
as the NATO summit closed on 25 April to demand that his country be involved in the 
diplomatic resolution of the war in Kosovo; he even raised the threat that if not, Russia would 
be pushed into war.61 Clinton probably expected that he would have to worry about Yeltsin. 
Increasingly, he also had to worry about Blair. 
 
On 3 May, the prime minister made the first of his visits to Kosovar refugee camps where he 
was personally and politically affected by the misery that he witnessed.62 Blair’s 
determination to find a solution was enhanced but he doubted whether Clinton was still in 
lockstep with him to achieve it. One Number 10 adviser documented Blair’s concern that the 
president would reach an agreement with Milosevic independently, thus ‘selling him down 
the river’; ‘If he does that,’ Blair was recorded as saying, angrily, ‘that’s it. I’m finished with 
him’.63 Tempers were not calm in Washington, either. The prime minister’s soaring rhetoric 
about good and evil being fought out over Kosovo led the president to suggest that he ‘pull 
himself together’ and stop the ‘domestic grandstanding’; one of Clinton’s aides wondered if 
Blair was ‘sprinkling too much adrenalin on his cornflakes’.64 The State Department’s Deputy 
Secretary, Strobe Talbot, privately remarked that ‘Winston’ Blair was ‘ready to fight to the 
last American’.65 Relations worsened when on 17 May the New York Times covered a leader 
column from the Financial Times which referred to British criticisms of Clinton’s lack of 
leadership over Kosovo. Furious that the original report might have been inspired by the 
prime minister’s press secretary, Alastair Campbell, Clinton ‘exploded’ in an ‘ugly’ telephone 
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call with Blair.66 Whoever was responsible in the British government, a line had been crossed 
in Anglo-American relations – airing criticism publicly, rather than privately – at a moment 
when Clinton was beleaguered. The president said to Blair that he ‘was sure [that] it gives you 
and your people a lot of pleasure to see me done down’.67 On the same day, Clinton indicated 
publicly for the first time that the military action in Kosovo might not be limited to the air 
campaign: ‘we have not and will not take any option off the table’.68 On 23 May he published 
his own article in the New York Times in which he stated that he did not ‘rule out other 
military options’ while sustaining the current bombing campaign.69 Ostensibly, it seems that 
Blair had forced Clinton into a public admission that ground troops might have to be part of 
the solution to the problem in Kosovo. Yet Clinton had told Blair at their 21 April meeting 
that he had regretted ruling out ground troops in his 24 March statement not because he 
believed them necessary, but because he accepted that his administration ‘could not continue 
to exclude the possibility’.70 On 10 May, the president’s advisers had also recognised that the 
government’s rhetoric had to change and on the 20th, Clinton met with them to discuss the 
timetable of an invasion.71 One of them has since said that ‘We didn’t need Blair to tell us we 
had to win this thing. Their suggestion that they convinced us is fantasy land’.72 Another aide 
judged that ‘Blair’s pressure did help steel some of us in the administration ... but ultimately 
his input was merely to speed up what would have happened anyway’.73 
 
The war in Kosovo ended without deployment of the ground troops that Blair had 
campaigned for, a strategy that had stretched his personal relationship with Clinton and 
diminished his reputation with the president’s administration. It is likely that the threat of a 
ground invasion was only one factor in Milosevic’s acceptance of peace terms on 3 June 
produced by American, EU and Russian negotiators. Others probably prevailed, particularly 
US perseverance, Russian involvement in the diplomatic process, the effect of NATO’s unity 
and its strategic bombing, increasing Serb losses and his own survival.74 Compromises were 
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duly made by both sides and on 10 June NATO halted its bombing campaign and Serb forces 
withdrew from Kosovo. 
 
On that day, Clinton phoned Blair to say ‘thanks, it’s been a good run’.75 The peace that was 
achieved in Kosovo in 1999 was partly the result of their relationship. The understanding 
between them had contributed to NATO’s cohesion and Blair had used it to enhance the effect 
of the ground troop lobby in Washington. The agreement in Kosovo was a success for Clinton 
whose record on international affairs had always been controversial as he and his 
administration strove to find a consistent approach to foreign policy. He described the 
cessation of 10 June in those terms when he spoke to a Democrats’ dinner that night.76 Yet in 
its achievement, Clinton had not only dealt with genocide and war in the Balkans; he had also 
faced political conflict at home and abroad about his leadership, the world role of the US and 
the overextension of its power. The complexity of the battles he had to fight explain why 
humanitarian intervention did not become a doctrine of US foreign policy and why Clinton 
did not make world order the theme of his final days. Instead, he proceeded as a pragmatist, 
reminding Americans that a globalized world was one which would affect their interests, 
hence the need for the US to take a lead.77 For the US president in the era in which he held the 
office, intervention had to be as much about practical politics as it did about morality. 
 
This was true too of Blair’s position in that he could not act without consideration of the costs 
to him, his government and the UK. Yet he was less encumbered than Clinton. A British 
prime minister could not affect world affairs as a US president could and thus he dealt with a 
different level of responsibility. Blair was also less experienced than Clinton, and more 
affected by the moral abhorrence he felt in response to the tragedy in Kosovo and his 
frustration with the reality of international politics and diplomacy. Rather than restrain his 
ambition, these factors actually enhanced it. He was personally emboldened having 
influenced the US president, presented the case for humanitarian intervention more 
powerfully than any other leader, and announced a doctrine for international community. 
Blair was said to have drawn lessons from Kosovo, principally the need to work with the US 
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and guide it away from unilateralism, and for Britain to be a ‘bridge’ between America and 
Europe.78 Together, these were the elements of his ‘awakening on foreign policy’ over 
Kosovo.79 For one journalist, it had been Blair’s ‘Idealism mixed with realpolitik, terror 
stirred with vanity’.80  
 
It must be remembered that Blair’s ‘awakening’ was rapid and defined by risk. Moreover, the 
doctrine he declared in Chicago was created in haste without careful diplomatic preparation 
amidst the intense, complex diplomacy and politics of the Kosovo crisis. The problems of 
international affairs that it sought to address and which were exposed in the Balkans were 
enormous in their significance. They were about the sovereignty of states, collective security, 
international law and the future of the UN. Since the end of the Cold War, those matters had 
exercised the international community that Blair sought to unite. His answers to the problems 
that it faced prioritised working with the US to guide its leaders and its power. In doing so 
over Kosovo, as over Iraq in 1998, he had had no difficulty in departing from international 
law and the primacy of the UN Security Council. While the humanitarian necessity of Kosovo 
had been overriding for most, the post-Cold War dominance and unilateral tendencies of the 
US which had caused concern in 1998 were now intensified. The US president did not seek to 
exacerbate them by proclaiming a new world order. Ironically, the British prime minister did. 
 
Blair and Bush at War: Iraq 
 
Had it not been for the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, the relationship between Blair 
and Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, might have been cordial but not close, varyingly 
collaborative but not historically consequential. It was 9/11 which produced the conditions for 
their personal cooperation, the more complex alliance between their governments and, 
ultimately, their fighting forces. For the two leaders, in different ways, it was the defining 
moment. The evolution of the Bush administration’s response to 9/11 produced a widely 
approved just war in Afghanistan and then a deeply controversial invasion of Iraq which 
enjoined the president and the prime minister, and eventually engulfed them in accusations of 
war guilt. As Iraq disintegrated after the coalition forces’ military victory, the main public 
justification for war – Saddam Hussein’s failure to prove that he had disarmed Iraq’s WMD – 
fell away as the invaders failed to prove that his regime had had them in the first place. Thus 
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the already fragile legitimacy of the war in most international opinion, let alone its morality, 
came under fierce scrutiny as post-war violence scarred Iraq and destabilised the region.  
 
Much has already been written about the motives for the war in official inquiries and also 
contemporary histories. In addition to the greater criticisms of the Bush administration’s 
precepts, preparations and purpose, there has been specific focus on the Blair-Bush 
relationship as a driving force on the road to war.81 Notably, given that Iraq became 
somewhat of a crucible in British political history after 2003, there has been particular interest 
in the priority Blair placed on loyalty to Bush, the American cause and Atlanticism, and what 
he did or did not achieve or accomplish in return.82 Such issues were among the most 
significant of the Iraq Inquiry which released its report in 2016.83 The remarks of its 
chairman, Sir John Chilcot, on its publication went further than its conclusions in one 
important regard. He judged that Blair ‘overestimated his ability to influence US decisions on 
Iraq’ and then said that ‘The UK’s relationship with the US has proved strong enough over 
time to bear the weight of honest disagreement. It does not require unconditional support 
where our interests or judgements differ.’84  
 
In his statement, Chilcot had referred to a note that Blair had written to Bush on 28 July 2002 
as the US government proceeded towards finalisation of its war plans for Iraq. It began with 
what seems an unequivocal avowal, ‘I will be with you, whatever.’85 As no formal decision 
had yet been taken by his Cabinet, or put to Parliament, this commitment suggested that Blair 
had, as one of his biographers has argued, made ‘the greatest error in diplomacy: declaring his 
hand too early’.86 He had offered his pledge before securing guarantees and ‘made it too easy 
for the Americans to take him for granted’. A weighty query follows: ‘Whether a little less 
eager trust and a little more Thatcherite rigidity would have given Blair more ability to shape 
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the world will be one of the enduring historical questions of the age.’87 To understand why 
Blair put himself in the position that he did, with all its consequences, is to try to grasp his 
personal beliefs and outlook and to interrogate his relationship with Bush. It is also to realise 
the limits of his power.  
 
In his memoirs, Bush describes the tasks he carried out on the day after 9/11. Chief among 
them was to telephone the world leaders who had sent messages of sympathy. ‘My first call,’ 
he wrote, ‘was with Prime Minister Tony Blair ... Tony began by saying he was “in a state of 
shock” and that he would stand with America “one hundred percent” … There was no 
equivocation in his voice. The conversation helped cement the closest friendship I would 
form with any foreign leader. As the years passed and the wartime decisions grew tougher, 
some of our allies wavered. Tony Blair never did’.88 Blair did not waver because he had found 
the purpose of his premiership which was ‘to steer [the Americans] in a sensible path’ with 
the aim of re-ordering the world.89 These were the lessons he had learned from Kosovo in 
1999; now he had the chance to alter global affairs if he could engage Bush and his 
administration.  
 
Blair’s reaction to 9/11 was immediate in its identification of terrorism as the new threat to 
civilisation, his resolution to stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with the Americans, and his 
determination to influence the US government.90 That process began with a five-page 
personal note sent to Bush on 12 September after their phone call. What was remarkable 
about this brief document was that it assumed the prime minister’s role as adviser to the 
president in a joint response to 9/11. Blair advised Bush on targeting Osama bin Laden and 
the Taliban in Afghanistan and constructing a new ‘political agenda against international 
terrorism’, adding that ‘If this is a war – and in practical, if not legal terms, it is – we need war 
methods’. That involved ‘[c]o-opting the rest of the world’.91 
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These were the matters that Blair and Bush discussed during the prime minister’s visit to 
Washington on 20 September 2001. On that day, in Congress, Bush made the most important 
speech of his presidency to date.92 Blair remembers Bush being ‘at peace with himself’ 
having ‘found his mission as president’.93 Actually, Blair was finding his own mission. His 
memoirs record that as he flew to the US on 20 September 2001, he felt that his ‘position as 
the world leader strongly articulating the need for comprehensive and strategic action was 
pretty well established’.94 Blair had been trying to guide Bush (‘I was regularly writing notes 
to him, raising issues, prompting his system and mine’) and ‘globetrotting – to the Middle 
East, Pakistan, Russia’.95 According to one account, Blair told Bush at their 20 September 
meeting: ‘Don’t get distracted; the priorities are … Al Qaida, Afghanistan, the Taliban’. The 
president said that he agreed and added ‘But when we have dealt with Afghanistan, we must 
come back to Iraq’.96  
 
That prospect troubled Blair. From early October he cautioned Bush ‘against widening the 
war’; ‘if we hit Iraq now,’ the prime minister wrote in another note to the president, ‘we 
would lose the Arab world, Russia, probably half the EU…’. Blair also urged Bush to address 
the Middle East Peace Process, ‘the huge undercurrent in this situation … the context in the 
Arab world’.97 What these thoughts indicated was that less than a month after 9/11, Blair had 
already recognised its historic effect and the opportunity it presented, not least for him. Those 
judgements were the themes of his impassioned speech at the Labour Party conference in 
Brighton on 2 October 2001. ‘This is a moment to seize’, he declared, ‘The Kaleidoscope has 
been shaken. The pieces are in flux. Soon they will settle again. Before they do, let us re-order 
this world around us.’98 Informed onlookers and those close to Blair recognised his 
transformation. Campbell’s diary recorded the journalist ‘Andrew Marr’s reaction … that it 
was as though [Blair] had levitated above the party’; Campbell himself added ‘indeed just 
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before I left the hotel, I had said to him I got the sense that this year he needed us less, and he 
needed his colleagues less’.99 Blair’s ambition was outgrowing his country. 
 
From the outset, then, in what would become a complex and controversial history of the US 
declaration of a War on Terror and the US-led, and UK-backed, invasion of Iraq in March 
2003, Blair was personally determined to influence the US government through his 
relationship with Bush. His fundamental objectives were unchanged from those he had 
outlined in Chicago in 1999. Hitherto, he had lacked the opportunity to pursue them but now, 
after 9/11, the threat of transnational terror, and the Bush administration’s insistence on 
dealing with Saddam Hussein, presented him with an opening. In comparison with 1999, 
Blair was now much more confident in his diplomacy, the foreign policy he wished Britain to 
pursue, the primacy he attached to relations with the United States, and in his vision of a new 
post-Cold War, post-9/11 order. He also had self-belief and a sense of his own stature as an 
international statesman. In Campbell’s opinion, it verged on self-importance.100 
 
What reception Blair’s interventions in Washington had at this point is unclear. His attempt to 
caution Bush about extending the war from Afghanistan to Iraq did not prevent the president 
from instructing his Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, on 21 November 2002 to order US 
Central Command to revisit war plans for Iraq and consider ‘what it would take to protect 
America by removing Saddam Hussein if we have to’.101 The Bush administration thereafter 
developed a momentum which Blair would seek to guide. In so doing, he would face the 
dilemma of choosing between his preferred course and that dictated by the Americans. His 
face-to-face chance to attempt to sway Bush came at the president’s ranch in Crawford, 
Texas, from 5 to 7 April 2002. In preparation, Blair asked his Chief of Staff, Jonathan Powell, 
for ‘a proper worked-out strategy’ for military action against Iraq and especially consideration 
of how the case should be made publicly. The issue, in his view, was why ‘from a centre-left 
perspective’ the argument was not obvious and the reason was that ‘people believe we are 
only doing it to support the US’ and ‘the immediate WMD problems don’t seem obviously 
worse than 3 years ago’. Blair’s solution was to ‘re-order our story and message. Increasingly, 
I think it should be about the nature of the regime. We do intervene – as per the Chicago 
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speech’.102 This note suggests that Blair had decided before the Crawford meeting that his 
government would support the Bush administration’s decision to act against Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq. Yet exactly what that meant, in detail, is not certain.  
 
At Crawford, Iraq was only one issue of many, with much time given to the Middle East 
Peace Process. According to Blair’s foreign policy adviser, David Manning, who was present, 
Bush told Blair that there was no war plan for Iraq but that Central Command was reviewing 
options and when they had done so, he would consider them. Manning also recounted that 
Blair pressed Bush on the necessity of engaging the UN, telling him later that ‘the President 
probably did want to build a coalition and that this had led him to dismiss pressure from some 
on the American right’.103 Blair’s strategy of influencing US policy-making at its apex 
seemed to have achieved a first success. Bush wrote little about the April 2002 Crawford 
meeting but did note that while he ‘didn’t have a lot of faith in the UN,’ he agreed to consider 
Blair’s suggestion that they seek ‘a UN Security Council resolution that presented Saddam 
with a clear ultimatum: allow weapons inspectors back into Iraq, or face serious 
consequences’.104  
 
In his own account of the meeting, Blair stated that he had been clear about ‘two things. The 
first was that Saddam had to be made to conform to the UN resolutions, that the years of 
obstruction and non-cooperation had to end. The second was that Britain had to remain, as a 
country, “shoulder to shoulder” with America’. This act ‘didn’t mean we sacrificed our 
interests to theirs; or subcontracted out our foreign policy. It meant that the alliance between 
our two nations was a vital strategic interest …’.105 Blair expected to achieve influence 
through loyalty. However, by July 2002, as US Central Command approached finalisation of 
Iraq war plans for the president on 4 August, Blair’s Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, became 
concerned that the prime minister’s conditions for supporting the Bush administration, 
namely preparation of public opinion, exhausting the UN route, and progress on the Middle 
East Peace Process, were being ignored in Washington.106 According to Campbell’s diary, 
when Straw raised doubts at an important meeting of ministers and advisers chaired by Blair 
on 23 July 2002, the prime minister said that ‘we had to be with the Americans’, adding ‘It’s 
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worse than you think, I actually believe in doing this’. His reply to the foreign secretary’s idea 
that Britain not join with the US in the invasion of Iraq was even more revealing of his 
position, and his understanding of the past. Blair ‘said that would be the biggest shift in 
foreign policy for fifty years and I’m not sure it's very wise’.107  
 
Only Blair’s conviction that the course he had set was right, and his self-belief in his ability to 
influence US policy through personal access to the president, can explain the opening line of 
his 28 July 2002 lengthy note to Bush, ‘I will be with you, whatever.’ Apparently definitive, 
this assertion was designed to convince the president of Blair’s allegiance and win him over 
to the consequent six-page strategic restatement of the necessity of a multilateral coalition, 
UN authority, evidence, the MEPP, ‘Post Saddam’ and a workable military plan.108 Public 
release of this memorandum via the Iraq Inquiry gave credence to the criticisms mentioned 
above that Blair gave unconditional support to the US government and overestimated his 
persuasive abilities. His diplomacy with Bush was certainly not akin to his diplomacy with 
Clinton over Kosovo and ground troops when he used private and public influence to force 
the president’s position. Three possible factors explain the difference. First, Blair may have 
judged his earlier approach to have been too costly or estimated that his statesmanship and 
stock were now higher; secondly, Blair was perhaps confident in his ability to counteract 
hawkish opinion in the Bush administration by influencing the president without strong-arm 
tactics; and thirdly, that he simply meant what he said. It is difficult to escape the 
interpretation that Blair believed in the objective of removing Saddam Hussein and in his own 
cause and effect in pledging his and the UK’s support for Bush and the US. It is also clear 
from his correspondence with Bush and his public statements that Blair’s ultimate goal was to 
achieve a new liberal world order. He may have preferred that the action against Iraq would 
be taken under UN authority with multilateral support, public opinion having been squared 
and with a US commitment to the MEPP, but he increasingly accepted that he would have to 
compromise on these ‘principles’. Thus although he swayed Bush at Camp David on 7 
September 2002 to persist in seeking UN authority despite US Vice President Dick Cheney’s 
opposition (and that of other hardliners in the administration), Blair also replied to Bush’s 
suggestion that war might be necessary, including British troops, with the phrase ‘I’m with 
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you’. Bush told Campbell, ‘Your guy’s got balls’.109 Roy Jenkins called it conviction that 
same month, adding ‘almost too much’.110  
 
After Bush had spoken at the UN and its Security Council had adopted resolution 1441, 
giving Iraq ‘a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations’, Blair’s resolve 
led him to conclude that although his ‘principles’ could not be defended, he would lead the 
UK in support of the US regardless.111 At a Downing Street meeting on 17 October 2002 with 
the foreign and defence secretaries, the chief of the defence staff, and advisors, the prime 
minister ‘concluded, that if there was a breach, and no second resolution [at the UN 
authorising the use of force against Iraq], ‘we and the US would take action’.112 He must have 
envisaged the use of Anglo-American military force against Iraq as a foundation stone of the 
international order which he saw as critical in a new world of terrorism. Yet it was an 
enormous gamble. The ‘principles’ he was about to abandon were the basis of the order he 
sought.  
 
Blair’s memoirs suggest that his ultimate decision to support the Americans militarily came 
during Christmas 2002, after Iraq had submitted its report to the UN on 7 December which 
failed to end speculation about whether it possessed WMDs. ‘So, in or out?’ Blair asked. ‘In, 
I concluded. And if in, better in fully and not partly. I still thought it possible to avoid war. … 
I was determined, at the least, to try to persuade the Americans to get more time. But I had 
said I would be with them, and if conflict could not be avoided, I would be in with the whole 
and not half a heart’.113 Regardless of the storms in domestic politics and among EU and UN 
member states about evidence, rationale and legality, Blair remained firm, as he had done 
when he thought the diplomacy of the Kosovo war could have been the end of him as prime 
minister. He maintained his unwavering stand at a meeting with Bush in Washington on 31 
January 2003 when the president told him that regardless of whether the UN Security Council 
agreed to a second resolution authorising force, the US would take military action. According 
to one account, Blair replied that he was ‘solidly with the President and ready to do whatever 
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it took to disarm Saddam’.114 Blair was still resolute even as Bush offered him a way out after 
being briefed about the knife-edge political situation in the UK on the question of the UN and 
legality. In response, with a fortitude which is remarkable either for its resolve or its 
recklessness, the prime minister told the president ‘I’m with you … I’m there to the very 
end’.115  
 
Blair’s determination was undaunted two days later, on 11 March, when his government came 
under friendly fire from Donald Rumsfeld. In a Pentagon press briefing, the US defense 
secretary intimated that British military involvement in the invasion of Iraq was ‘unclear’ and 
not vital.116 This was acid to Blair’s position, particularly in Parliament, and he was 
furious.117 Straw used the occasion to renew the case that he had put to the prime minister 
previously. Campbell’s diary records him saying that ‘Rumsfeld’s idiotic comments gave us a 
way out’; the UK could contribute solely to the post-conflict humanitarian phase and leave the 
invasion to the Americans. As Blair was ‘not keen’, Straw told him, bluntly, that ‘we were 
dealing, however right he thought it was, with a US “war of choice” and we had to 
understand, as [US Secretary of State Colin] Powell told him the whole time, that some of the 
people around Bush could not care two fucks about us whatever, and that went for TB as 
much as the rest of us’.118 At this vital instant, Manning supported Straw, who ‘was 
absolutely vituperative about Rumsfeld and said we were being driven by their political 
strategy’. Blair said that ‘maybe, but it was still the right thing to do’.119 With war days away, 
the prime minister remained personally dedicated to it, to Bush, Anglo-American relations, 
Atlanticism and the idea of the international order. He held this position seemingly without 
calculation of the damage that was being done to the prospects for that order, or, conversely, 
with acceptance of it as a necessary risk. 
 
In the House of Commons on 18 March 2003, Blair went on to recommend a vote in favour of 
the deployment of UK military forces in Iraq. He made the case in the manner he was 
increasingly prone to do, forcefully and without caveat, but there is no reason to doubt that he 
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believed what he said in his opening lines. The outcome of the war in Iraq would ‘determine 
the way Britain and the world confront the central security threat of the 21st century; the 
development of the UN; the relationship between Europe and the US; the relations within the 
EU and the way the US engages with the rest of the world. It [would] determine the pattern of 
international politics for the next generation’.120 The prime minister’s conviction compelled 
MPs; he won the vote and UK forces joined those of the US in the invasion of Iraq. The 
eventual descent of Iraq into violence and destruction and the failure to prove that it had had 
WMD would ensure that Blair’s conceptions and motives were widely questioned as the 
liberal order he sought dissolved. Yet the costs of both had already been weighed before a 
shot had been fired in Iraq. 
 
On 17 March, Robin Cook, who had been Blair’s foreign secretary during the Kosovo war in 
1999, resigned from the government and delivered a personal statement in the Commons. 
With ‘a heavy heart’, Cook reminded MPs that ‘Britain is being asked to embark on a war 
without agreement in any of the international bodies of which we are a leading partner – not 
NATO, not the European Union and, now, not the Security Council’. This was ‘a serious 
reverse’ because only ‘a year ago, we and the United States were part of a coalition against 
terrorism that was wider and more diverse than I would ever have imagined possible’. Calling 
upon the most significant judge, history, Cook said that it would ‘be astonished at the 
diplomatic miscalculations that led so quickly to the disintegration of that powerful coalition’. 
While the US could ‘afford to go it alone’ Britain could not because it was not a superpower. 
Blair would have agreed with that measure but not with Cook’s wider thesis, even though it 
was essentially a reassertion of the case for liberal order and multilateralism that the prime 
minister had promoted amid his Kosovo awakening in Chicago in 1999: ‘Our interests are 
best protected not by unilateral action but by a multilateral agreement and a world order 
governed by rules,’ Cook said. ‘Yet tonight the international partnerships most important to 
us are weakened: the European Union is divided; the Security Council is in stalemate. Those 
are heavy casualties of a war in which a shot has yet to be fired.’121 
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The wars of 1999 and 2003 were products of the end of the Cold War. While both had 
specific origins in their moments, the greater change that produced them was the passing of a 
global system which had contained forces of nationalism and sectarianism within two 
superpower alliances. When unrestrained, those forces generated violent disintegration in the 
Balkans and resistance in Iraq. The consequent wars that happened there were also about 
international order, what form it should take, and who should lead it. Integral to these 
questions were others which had been pressing since 1989 but had actually been debated for 
much longer. Those were what role the United States should play in the world and for what 
purpose, and how other nations and institutions should act in response. Although the wars in 
Kosovo and Iraq were fought for very different reasons, in very different settings, and were 
separated by an epochal rupture, they were united as post-Cold War conflicts in which such 
matters were at stake. The dominant actors in these events were two presidents and their 
administrations. While the politics and periods of the Clinton and Bush presidencies were 
distinct, the power and interventions of their foreign and defence policies and their challenge 
to the existing international order of the UN Charter and UN Security Council reveal strong 
continuities. One significant disparity, born in part from 9/11, was the Bush administration’s 
pursuit of a new international order. Bush was not alone in this aim; Blair stood with him, as 
he had done with Clinton, in the name of the doctrine of international community he had 
hastily announced during the Kosovo war and saw as an objective for the Iraq war. 
 
Blair’s ‘awakening on foreign policy’ over Kosovo was critical to the course of these 
events.122 His mix of idealism, realpolitik, self-belief and vision were ultimately too much of 
an awakening for Clinton. They were not for Bush, even if Blair’s liberal world order was too 
liberal for the hardliners in his administration. Blair’s post-Kosovo certainty and confidence 
nevertheless coalesced with Bush’s determination to ensure that terrorists would not again 
attack the US and that America’s power would be reaffirmed after what he saw as the Pearl 
Harbor of the new age. The prime minister’s loyalty to his own idea of the world must explain 
his loyalty to Bush and his devotion to defeating Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime. It does not 
explain why he could not see the essential fault in his approach. Henry Kissinger had 
observed it in May 1999 when he described international reactions to American involvement 
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in Kosovo: ‘The paradox is that a country that thinks of itself as acting in the name of 
universal values is seen by too many others as acting arbitrarily, or inexplicably, or 
arrogantly.’123 Six days after the assaults on Baghdad had begun in 2003, Blair wrote a note to 
Bush called ‘The Fundamental Goal’. It started by saying that this was the moment when the 
president could ‘define international politics for the next generation: the true post-cold war 
world order’. He added: ‘Our ambition is big: to construct a global agenda around which we 
can unite the world; rather than dividing it into rival centres of power.’ Blair’s very next point 
serves to illuminate his world view and its flaw: ‘The problem is that a ludicrous and distorted 
view of the US is clouding the enormous attractions of the fundamental goal.’124 
 
The history of the wars in Kosovo and Iraq suggest that world order could not be achieved via 
a UK-US design, especially if prosecuted by force without either multilateral support or 
accepted legality. That is the conclusion reached when these wars are viewed with the longer 
history of international affairs, international institutions and international law in mind. Claims 
to liberal order and universal values, to Anglo-American, Atlanticist, Western idealism, and to 
doctrines of supposed international community, were, especially in the methods they were 
pursued after 9/11, shown to be unrealistic for a post-Cold War world which was then 
disordered by them. A UK prime minister, however familiar with a US president, could not 
transcend the realities of power or get him to defend principles or promote policies which 
were not prioritised by his administration. He could not also expect to resolve a century’s 
problems of world order in one doctrine. That fact was especially true after 9/11 when the 
liberal intervention that Blair had sought since 1999 became a casualty of the US-led war 
against Iraq that he supported and when Anglo-American foreign policies were profoundly 
questioned. The search for order in dealing with the legacies of imperialism, World Wars and 
the Cold War now also had to face the Iraq War. Power politics would return and new leaders 
would learn, as their predecessors had done, that no individual or partnership can alone bring 
world order and that order itself might only ever be an ambition. 
 
[James Ellison, 17 July 2020; revised 15 August 2020] 
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